Algorithms for Simpler Decision-Making (2/2)

These contrasting characteristics delineate two views of decision-making — traditional rational theory and nonrational theory[1]. Traditional rationality suggests a good decision is made by considering all decision alternatives and accompanying consequences, estimating and multiplying the subjective probability by the expected utility of each consequence, and then selecting the option with the greatest expected utility. But for human decision-makers in uncertain environments, this process is psychologically unrealistic (Gigerenzer, 2001). Instead of viewing humans as omniscient beings, nonrational theories, such as bounded rationality, illustrate a decision-making process in which the environment is marked by limited time, resources, and information; where rational optimization is unfeasible and unwise. While traditional rationality entices with a sense of reasonableness, applied real-world decision-making naturally abides by the principles of nonrationality. So, when standard rational algorithms are advertised as aids to human decision-makers, a false assumption of compatibility between intrinsically different decision strategies is made. Algorithm aversion, directly and indirectly, can be traced back to this assumption.

Due to their probabilistic focus, standard algorithmic decision aids confront human cognition head on — you either accept or reject the algorithmic insight; all or nothing. Because these algorithms perform a process of rational optimization, opportunities for integrating with human nonrationality are sparse. In the predominant consumer model of algorithmic decision-making, this mismatch of rationality and nonrationality manifests as an interaction where a human decision-maker performs an intuitive calculation, consults the algorithm’s calculation, and then must choose a course of action with or without regard to the algorithmic advice. Needless to say, very little interaction occurs in this model as intuitive and statistical judgment are pitted against one another — a psychological tug-o’-war dominated by intuition time and again.

To design cognitive prosthetics capable of linking the human mind to normally incomprehensible data flows, enabling better decision-making, nonrationality must be the founding principle. Meeting human decision-makers in the world of uncertainty, where decisions must be made with limited time (fast) and with limited information (frugal), the application of the fast-and-frugal framework to the design of algorithms is a contemporary case of mobilizing nonrational theory for cohesive human-algorithm decision systems (Phillips, Neth, Woike, & Gaissmaier, 2017). While not without limitations, this move to structure heuristic-led algorithms allows human decision-makers and algorithms to share the step-by-step gathering, ordering, and evaluating of available data and ultimately arrive at a single, joint conclusion. In doing so, human-algorithm cognition is meshed upstream in the decision process permitting a more participatory, less confrontational augmentation experience.

This integration of algorithmic statistical rigor with humanly heuristic-led sensibility is an evidently difficult task that calls for a multidisciplinary community. As the discourse flounders between the abstract and the pragmatic, it is important to consider what we want, expect, and demand from our decision-makers and our decision-making algorithms.